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The world is four-dimensional according to fundamental physics, governed by basic laws that operate in a
spacetime that has no unique division into space and time. Yet our subjective experience of this world is divided
into present, past, and future. What is the origin of this division? What is its four-dimensional description?
Is this the only way experience can be organized consistently with the basic laws of physics? This paper
reviews such questions through simple models of information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes) such as
ourselves.
Past, present, and future are not properties of four-dimensional spacetime but notions describing how individ-
ual IGUSes process information. Their origin is to be found in how these IGUSes evolved or were constructed.
The past, present, and future of an IGUS is consistent with the four-dimensional laws of physics and can be
described in four-dimensional terms. The present, for instance, is not a moment of time in the sense of a space-
like surface in spacetime. Rather there is a localized notion of present at each point along an IGUS’ world line.
The common present of many localized IGUSes is an approximate notion appropriate when they are sufficiently
close to each other and have relative velocities much less than that of light.
Some features of the present, past, and future organization are closely related to basic physical laws. For
example, the retarded nature of electromagnetic radiation and the second law of thermodynamics are the likely
reasons we cannot remember the future. But modes of organization that are different from present, past and
future can be imagined that are also consistent with the basic laws of physics. We speculate why the present,
past, and future organization might be favored by evolution and suggest that therefore it may be a cognitive
universal.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
A lesson of the physics of the last century is that, up here, on
length scales much greater than the Planck length, the world is
four-dimensional with a classical spacetime geometry. There
is neither a unique notion of space nor a unique notion of time.
Rather, at each point in spacetime there are a family of time-
like directions and three times as many spacelike directions.
Yet, in this four-dimensional world, we divide our subjective
experience up into past, present, and future. These seem very
different. We experience the present, remember the past, and
predict the future. How is our experience organized in this
way? Why is it so organized? What is the four-dimensional
description of our past, present, and future? Is this the only
way experience can be organized? This paper is concerned
with such questions.
The general laws of physics by themselves provide no an-
swers. Past, present, and future are not properties of four-
dimensional spacetime. Rather, they are properties of a spe-
cific class of subsystems of the universe that can usefully be
called information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes)
[1]. The term is broad enough to include both single repre-
sentatives of biological species that have evolved naturally
and mechanical robots that were constructed artificially. It
includes human beings both individually and collectively as
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members of groups, cultures, and civilizations.
To understand past, present, and future it is necessary to
understand how an IGUS employs such notions in the pro-
cessing of information. To understand why it is organized in
this way it is necessary to understand how it is constructed and
ultimately how it evolved. Questions about past, present, and
future therefore are most naturally the province of psychology,
artificial intelligence, evolutionary biology, and philosophy1.
However, questions concerning past, present, and future
cannot be completely divorced from physics. For instance,
the notions must be describable in four-dimensional terms just
to be consistent with the fundamental picture of spacetime.
Further, as we will review, the distinctions between the past,
present, and future of an IGUS depend upon some of the ar-
rows of time that our universe exhibits such as that summa-
rized by the second law of thermodynamics. In the tradition of
theoretical physics, we illustrate these connections with sim-
ple models of an IGUS — achieving clarity at the risk of ir-
relevance. Our considerations are entirely based on classical
physics.2 One such model IGUS — a robot — is described
1 See, e.g [2] for a collection of philosophical papers on time. This paper
does not aim to discuss or resolve any of the philosophical debates on the
nature of time.
2 Arrows of time in the context of quantum mechanics, as well as the quan-
tum mechanical arrow of time, are discussed in [3] in the framework of a
time-neutral generalized formulation of quantum theory. The author knows
of no obstacle of principle to extending the present classical discussion to
2in Section II. It is simple enough to be easily analyzed, but
complex enough to suggest how realistic IGUSes distinguish
between past, present, and future. The four-dimensional de-
scription of this robot is discussed in Section III. There we
will see that the robot’s present is not a moment in space-
time. Rather, there is a present at each instant along the robot’s
world line consisting of its most recently acquired data about
its external environment. The approximate common notion of
‘now’ that could be utilized by a collection of nearby robots
moving slowly with respect to one another is also described.
Section IV describes the connection of present, past and
future with the thermodynamic arrow of time and the radia-
tion arrow of time. It seeks to answer the question, “Could
we construct a robot that would remember the future?” Sec-
tion V describes alternative organizations of a robot’s experi-
ence that are different from past, present, and future. These
are consistent with the four-dimensional laws of physics. But
the possibility of these alternative organizations shows that
past, present, and future are not consequences of these laws.
We speculate, however, that, as a consequence of the laws of
physics, the past, present, and future organization may offer
an evolutionary advantage over the other modes of organiza-
tion. This supports a conjecture that past, present, and fu-
ture may be a cognitive universal [5] for sufficiently localized
IGUSes.
II. A MODEL IGUS
Imagine constructing a robot which gathers and utilizes in-
formation in the following manner (Figure 1):
Information Gathering: The robot has n+1 memory locations
P0,P1, · · · ,Pn which we call ‘registers’ for short. These con-
tain a time series of images of its external environment as-
sembled as follows: At times separated by intervals τ∗ the
image in register Pn is erased and replaced by the image in
Pn−1. Then the image in Pn−1 is erased and replaced by the
image in Pn−2, and so on. For the last step, the robot cap-
tures a new image of its external environment and stores it
in register P0. Thus, at any one time, the robot possesses
a coarse-grained image history of its environment extending
over a time (n + 1)τ∗. The most recent image is in P0; the
oldest is in Pn.
Information Utilization: The robot employs the information
in the registers P0,P1, · · · ,Pn to compute predictions about its
environment at times to the future of the data in P0 and direct
its behavior based upon these predictions. It does this in two
steps employing two different processes of computation:
• Schema: The robot’s memory stores a simplified model
of its environment containing, not all the information
in P0,P1, · · · ,Pn, but only those parts important for the
quantum mechanics in that framework. For the special features of history
in quantum mechanics see, e.g. [4].
FIG. 1: Information processing in a model robot. The information
flow in the robot described in the text is represented schematically
in this diagram. The internal workings of the robot are within the
dotted box; its external environment is without. Every proper time
interval τ∗ the robot captures an image of its external environment.
In the example illustrated, this is of a stack of cards labeled a,b,c,
etc. whose top member changes from time to time. The captured im-
age is stored in register P0 which constitutes the robot’s present. Just
before the next capture the image is P3 is erased and images in P0, P1,
and P3 are shifted to the right making room for the new image in P0.
The registers P1, P2, and P3 therefore constitute the robot’s memory
of the past. At each capture, the robot forgets the image in register
P3. The robot uses the images in P0,P1,P2, and P3 in two processes
of computation: C (“conscious”) and U (“unconscious”). The pro-
cess U uses the data in all registers to update a simplified model or
schema of the external environment. That is used by C together with
the most recently acquired data in P0 to make predictions about its
environment to the future of the data in P0, make decisions, and direct
behavior accordingly. The robot may therefore be said to experience
(through C) the present in P0, predict the future, and remember the
past in P1,P2, and P3.
robot’s functioning. This model is called a schema [1].
Each time interval τ∗, the robot updates its schema mak-
ing use of the information in P0 by a process of compu-
tation we denote by U .
The schema might contain the locations and trajecto-
ries of food, predators, obstacles to locomotion, fellow
robots, etc. It might contain hard-wired rules for suc-
cess (e.g. get food — yes, be food — no) and perhaps
even crude approximations to the rules of geometry and
the laws of physics (e.g. objects generally fall down).
It might contain summaries of regularities of the envi-
ronment abstracted from the information gathered long
before the period covered by registers P0, · · · ,Pn or ex-
plained to it by other robots, etc.3
• Decisions and Behavior: Each time interval τ∗ the robot
uses its schema and the fresh image in P0 to assess
its situation, predict the future, and make decisions on
3 A history book is a familiar part of the schema of the collective IGUS
linked by human culture. It is a summary and analysis of records gathered
at diverse times and places. That is true whether the history is of human
actions or the scientific history of the universe. The schema resulting from
the reconstruction of present records simplifies the process of future pre-
diction. (For more on utility of history, see [4].)
3what behavior to exhibit next by a process of computa-
tion that we denote by C. This is distinct from U . The
important point for this paper is that the robot directly
employs only the most recently acquired image in regis-
ter P0 in this process of computationC. The information
in P1, · · · ,Pn is employed only through the schema.
It seems possible that such a robot could be constructed.
As a model of sophisticated IGUSes such as ourselves it is
grossly oversimplified. Yet, it possesses a number of features
that are similar to those in sophisticated IGUSes that are rel-
evant for understanding past, present, and future: The robot
has a coarse-grained memory of its external environment con-
tained in registers P0,P1, · · · ,Pn. The robot has two processes
of computation, C and U . Without entering into the treacher-
ous issue of whether the robot is conscious, the two processes
have a number of similarities with our own processes of con-
scious and unconscious computation:
• U computation provides input to decision-making C
computation.
• There is direct input to C computation only from the
most recently acquired image in the register P0. The
images in P1, · · · ,Pn affect C only through the schema
computed in U .
• Information flows into and out from the register P0 di-
rectly used by C.
Equally evident are some significant differences between
the robot and ourselves. Our information about the external
environment is not exclusively visual, it is not stored in a lin-
ear array of registers, nor is it transferred from one to the other
in the simple manner described. Input and records are not
separated by sharp time divisions. We can consciously access
memories of other than the most recent data, although often
imperfectly and after modification by unconscious computa-
tion. This list of differences can easily be extended, but that
should not obscure the similarities discussed above.
The analogies between the robot and ourselves can be em-
phasized by employing everyday subjective terminology to
describe the robot. For example, we will call C and U compu-
tation ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ secure in the confidence
that such terms can be eliminated in favor of the mechanical
description we have employed up to this point if necessary
for clarity. Proceeding in this way, we can say that the robot
‘observes’ its environment. The register P0 contains a record
of the ‘present’, and the registers P1, · · ·Pn are records of the
‘past’4. When the register Pn is erased, the robot has ‘forgot-
ten’ its contents. The present extends5 over a finite interval6
4 For the moment we take the records P1, · · ·Pn to define the past. Section IV
will connect this notion of past with other physical notions of ‘past’, that
defined by the the time direction toward the big bang for instance.
5 As James [6] put it more eloquently: “... the practically cognized present
is no knife-edge, but a saddleback, with a certain breadth of its own, on
which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions in time.”
6 For human IGUSes the time τ∗ can be taken to be of order the .1s separation
time needed discriminate between two visual signals [7].
τ∗.
The robot has conscious focus on the present, but only ac-
cess to the past through the records that are inputs to the un-
conscious computation of its schema. The robot can thus be
said to ‘experience’ the present and ‘remember’ the past. The
‘flow of time’ is the movement of information into the register
of conscious focus and out again. Prediction requires compu-
tation — either conscious or unconscious — from memories
of the present and past acquired by observation and is thus
distinct from remembering.
The subjective past, present, and future, the flow of time,
and the distinction between predicting and remembering are
represented concretely and physically in the structure and
function of the model robot. We now proceed to describe this
structure and function in four-dimensional terms.
III. THE PRESENT IS NOT A MOMENT IN TIME
This section gives the four-dimensional, spacetime descrip-
tion of the robot specified in the previous section.7 For sim-
plicity we consider the flat spacetime of special relativity
(Minkowski space). But with little change it could be a curved
spacetime of general relativity.
A. Some Features of Minkowski Space
We begin by recalling8 a few important features of four-
dimensional spacetime that are illustrated in Figure 2. Events
occur at points in spacetime. At each point Q there is a light
cone consisting of two parts. The future light cone is the three-
dimensional surface generated by the light rays emerging from
Q. The past light cone is similarly defined by the light rays
converging on Q. (The labels ‘future’ and ‘past’ are conven-
tions at this point in the discussion. In Section IV we will
define them in the cosmological context.) Points inside the
light cone of Q are timelike separated from it; points outside
the light cone are spacelike separated. Points inside the future
light cone of Q are in its future; points inside the past light
cone are in its past. Points outside the light cone are neither.
The center of mass of a localized IGUS, such as the robot of
the previous section, describes a timelike world line in space-
time. At each point along the world line, any tangent to it lies
inside the light cone so that the IGUS is moving at less than
the speed of light in any inertial frame.
A moment in time is a three-dimensional spacelike surface
in spacetime — one in which any two nearby points are space-
like separated. Each spacelike surface divides spacetime into
two regions — one to its future and one to its past. A fam-
ily of spacelike surfaces such that each point in spacetime lies
on one and only member of the family specifies a division of
7 An abbreviated version of this discussion was given in [4].
8 For a classic text on special relativity from a spacetime point of view, see
[8]
4FIG. 2: Spacetime Concepts. This spacetime diagram represents a
three-dimensional slice of a four-dimensional flat spacetime defined
by three axes ct, x, and y of the four specifying an inertial (Lorentz)
frame. The ideas of event, light cone, world line, and spacelike sur-
face are illustrated. An event is a point in spacetime like Q. Each
point has a future and past light cone. A spacelike surface like the
one illustrated defines an instant in time. Each such surface divides
spacetime into two regions conventionally called the future of this
surface and its past. There are an infinity of such families and thus
infinitely many different ways of defining instants in time and their
futures and pasts. In the context of cosmology, the past of a space-
like surface is defined to be the region closest to the big bang and the
future is the region furthest away.
spacetime into space and time. The family of surfaces defined
by constant values of the time of a particular inertial frame
is an example (e.g. the surfaces of constant ct in Figures 2-
4). Different families of spacelike surfaces define different
notions of space and different notions of time none of which
is preferred over the other.
B. The Past, Present, and Future of the Robot
Figure 3 shows the world line of the robot introduced in
Section II together with the world line of an object in its
environment that appears in the robot’s stored images. The
robot illustrated has a short memory with only four registers
P0,P1,P2,P3 whose contents in each interval τ∗ are indicated
by the content of the boxes to the right of the world line. These
contents change at proper time intervals τ∗ as described in
Section II.
The contents of the register P0 defining the robot’s present
do not define a spacelike surface representing a moment in
time. They do not even define an instant along the robot’s
world line since the contents of P0 are consistent over proper
time intervals τ∗. Rather, there is content defining the present
for every instant along the world line. For each point along
the world line the most recently acquired image defines the
present. That is the four-dimensional description of the
FIG. 3: A spacetime description of the present and past of the robot
whose information processing is illustrated in Figure 1. In addition
to the world line of the robot, the figure shows the world line of
an external object that is the source of its images such as the stack
of cards in Figure 1. This source changes its shape at discrete in-
stants of time demarcated by ticks, running through configurations
· · ·b,c,d,e, f ,g, · · · . The configuration in each time interval of the
object’s world line is labeled to its left. At discrete instants separated
by proper time τ∗, the robot captures an image of the object. The
light rays conveying the image from object to robot are indicated by
dotted lines. The images are stored in the registers P0,P1,P2, and
P3 described in Figure 1. The contents of these registers in between
image captures are displayed in the boxes with P0 on the left and P3
on the right. The history of the contents of the register P0 consti-
tute the four-dimensional notion of ‘now’ for this robot (the heavily
outlined boxes in the figure). The present is not one instant along
the robot’s world line, much less a spacelike surface in spacetime.
Rather, there is a ‘now’ for each instant along the robot’s world line
extending over proper time τ∗. The evolution of the contents P0 can
be described four-dimensionally and is fully consistent with special
relativity. In a similar way the contents of P1,P2, and P3 constitute a
four-dimensional notion of ‘past’.
present. In a similar way, the data acquired earlier and stored
in registers P1,P2,P3 define the robot’s past for each point
along the world line.
Thus, there is no conflict between the four-dimensional re-
ality of physics and the subjective past, present, and future
of an IGUS. Indeed, as defined above, the subjective past,
present, and future are four-dimensional notions. They are
not properties of spacetime but of the history of a particular
IGUS. In Section V we will see that IGUSes constructed dif-
ferently from our robot could have different notions of past,
5present, and future. All of these are fully consistent with a
four-dimensional physical reality.
However, there is a conflict between ordinary language and
the four-dimensional, IGUS-specific notions of past, present,
and future. To speak of the “present moment” of an IGUS,
for instance, risks confusion because it could be construed to
refer to a spacelike surface in spacetime stretching over the
whole universe. No such surface is defined by physics.9 In
fact, the “moment” in the context of this section refers to the
most recently acquired data of an IGUS. This is not a notion
restricted to one point on the IGUS’ world line which some-
how moves along it. Rather is a notion present at every point
along the world line.
C. The Common Present
The previous discussion has concerned the present, past,
and future of individual localized IGUSes. We now turn to the
notion of a common present that may be held by collections
of IGUSes separated in space.
When someone asked Yogi Berra10 what time it was, he is
reported to have replied “Do you mean now?” The laughter
usually evoked by this anecdote shows how strongly we hold
a common notion of the present. More precisely, different
IGUSes agree on ‘what is happening now’. This section is
concerned with the limitations on the accuracy of that agree-
ment arising both from the construction of the IGUSes and the
limitations of defining simultaneity in special relativity. We
continue to use robot model IGUSes to make the discussion
concrete.
Figure 4 shows the world lines of two robots in spacetime
together with the intervals on their world lines that define their
individual notions of ‘now’. There are at least two reasons
that there is no unambiguous notion of a common ‘now’ that
can be shared by the two robots. The first is the elementary
observation11 that the present for each individual robot is not
defined to an accuracy better than τ∗. The second reason arises
from special relativity.
A precise common ‘now’ would specify a correspondence
between events on the two world lines. Such a correspondence
would specify a notion of simultaneity between events on the
world lines. But there is no unique notion of simultaneity pro-
vided by special relativity. Rather there are many different
notions corresponding to the different possible spacelike sur-
9 There is no evidence for preferred frames in spacetime and modern ver-
sions of the Michelson-Morley experiment and other tests of special relativ-
ity set stringent limits on their existence. The fractional accuracy of these
experiments range down to 10−21 making Lorentz invariance at accessible
energy scales one of the most accurately tested principles in physics. See
e.g. [9].
10 Lawrence E. Berra, a catcher for the New York Yankees baseball team in
the 1950’s. See [10]
11 The ambiguity in the common present arising from the finite time of IGUS
operation has been discussed in [11] which includes a review of current
neurophysiological data bearing on this question.
FIG. 4: The ambiguous common present. This spacetime diagram
shows the world lines of two similarly constructed robots A and B.
The intervals of proper time of length τ∗ over which the contents of
the registers defining their individual presents are constant are demar-
cated by ticks. A common present would be defined by an identifica-
tion of each interval on one world line with that on the other ‘at the
same time’ (to the accuracy τ∗). But special relativity allows many
different such identifications. Using the constant t surfaces of the in-
ertial frame illustrated is one way to define a common present; but
any other spacelike surface such as the one shown would do equally
well. The range of ambiguity for intervals on B that could be said
to be ‘at the same time’ as one interval on A is shown as a shaded
region. The figure shows two robots separated by a distance (e.g.,
as defined in the rest frame of one) over which the light travel time
is longer than τ∗ In this situation the ambiguity in the definition of
a common present is much larger than τ∗. However, if the distance
between the robots is much smaller than cτ∗, and if their relative ve-
locity is much less than c so this continues to be the case, then the
ambiguity is much smaller than τ∗. An approximate common present
can then be defined.
faces that can intersect the two world lines. Figure 4 illustrates
the range of ambiguity.
To illustrate the ambiguity of the present more dramatically,
imagine you are a newscaster on the capital planet Trantor of
a galaxy-wide empire some hundreds of thousands of years in
the future. News of events all over the galaxy pour in con-
stantly via electromagnetic signals. You want to broadcast
a program called ‘The Galaxy Today’ reviewing important
events in the last 24 hours (galactic standard). But what time
do you assign to the latest news from the planet Terminus at
the edge of the galaxy 60,000 light years away? There is an in-
6ertial frame12 in which those events happened within the last
24 hours. But in the approximate rest frame of the galaxy,
they happened 60,000 years ago. There is thus no unambigu-
ous notion of ‘present’ for the collective IGUS consisting of
the citizens of the galactic empire because the ambiguities in
defining simultaneity are large compared to the time scales
on which human events happen. You could, of course, fix on
the time of the galactic rest frame as a standard for simul-
taneity. But in that case the only comprehensive program you
could broadcast would be ‘The Galaxy 60,000 Years Ago’.
One imagines the audience for this on Terminus would not be
large since the program would be seen 120,000 years after the
events there happened.
The satellites comprising the Global Positioning System are
an example of a collective IGUS closer to home that faces a
similar problem. The special relativistic ambiguity in defin-
ing simultaneity for two satellites is of order the light travel
time between them in the approximate inertial frame in which
the Earth is at rest. That is much larger than the light travel
time across the few meters accuracy to which the system aims
to locate events. Precise agreement on a definition of simul-
taneity is therefore needed. Each satellite clock is corrected
so that it broadcasts the time of a clock on the Earth’s geoid
(approximately the ocean surface) [12].
No such agreement on a definition of simultaneity appears
to be a prerequisite for the everyday notion of ‘now’ employed
by human IGUSes. Rather, we seem to be employing an ap-
proximate, imprecise notion of the common present appropri-
ate in everyday situations and characterized by the following
contingencies:
1. The time scale of perception τ∗ is short compared to the
time scales on which interesting features of the environ-
ment vary.
2. Individual IGUSes are moving relatively to one another
at velocities small compared to c.
3. The light travel time between IGUSes in an inertial
frame in which they are nearly at rest is small compared
to the time scales τ∗.
Contingency (1) means that the ambiguity in the ‘now’ of each
IGUS is negligible in the construction of a common present.
Contingency (3), based on (2), means that the ambiguity aris-
ing from the definition of simultaneity is negligible13.
Collections of robots satisfying contingencies 1-3 can agree
on what is happening ‘now’. Consider just two robots — Al-
12 For example, there is the inertial frame moving with speed V with respect
to the galactic rest frame such that
∆t ′ = γ[∆t −V (∆x/c)]
where γ = (1−V 2)−1/2, ∆t ′ = 24hrs, ∆t = 6×104yr, and ∆x = 6×104 light
years. The required velocity is within a few parts in 107 of the velocity of
light.
13 These kinds of contingencies and the synchronization protocols necessary
when they are violated have been discussed in [13].
ice and Bob. Alice can send Bob a description of the essen-
tial features of the image currently in her register P0. Bob can
check whether these essential features are the same as those of
the image in his register P0 at the time of receipt. He can then
signal back agreement or disagreement. As long as the light
travel time is much shorter than τ∗ (contingency 3), and as
long as the essential features vary on much longer time scales
(contingency 1) Alice and Bob will agree. Contingency 2 en-
sures that this agreement will persist over an interesting time
scale. Thus Alice and Bob can construct a common present,
but it is a present that is local, inherently approximate, and
contingent upon their relation to each other and their environ-
ment. This approximate common ‘now’ is not a surface in
spacetime.
No modification of the laws of physics is needed to under-
stand the common now of a group of IGUSes as has some-
times been suggested [14]. The common nows of IGUSes
meeting the above contingencies will coincide approximately
with constant time surfaces in any inertial frame in which they
are approximately at rest. But these frames are not singled out
by the laws of physics. Indeed, the experimental evidence
against preferred frames is special relativity is extraordinarily
good [9]. Rather the frames are singled out by the particular
situations of the IGUSes themselves
IV. WHY DON’T WE REMEMBER THE FUTURE?
The fundamental dynamical laws of physics are invariant
under time reversal to an accuracy adequate for organizing
everyday experience.14 They are time neutral. The Ein-
stein equation of general relativity and Maxwell’s equations
for electrodynamics are examples. But the boundary condi-
tions specifying solutions to these equations describing our
universe are not time symmetric. The universe has a smooth
(near homogeneous and isotropic) big bang at one end of time
and a very different condition at the other end. This might
be the unending expansion driven by a cosmological constant
of the simplest cosmological models favored by observation
[15]. Or with different assumptions on the matter it could be a
highly irregular big crunch. In any event, one end is different
from the other15.
By convention, this paper refers throughout to the times
closer to the big bang as the ‘past’ and times further away
as the ‘future’. Asymmetry between past and future boundary
conditions is the origin of the various time asymmetries —
‘arrows of time’ — exhibited by our universe. The arrow of
time associated with the second law of thermodynamics is an
14 The effective theory of the weak interactions applicable well below the
Planck scale is not time-reversal invariant. This is important, for instance,
for the synthesis of baryons in the early universe but negligible for the
functioning of our robot. See, e.g. [3] for further discussion.
15 We thus exclude, mainly for simplicity, the kind of cosmological model
where initial and final conditions are related by time symmetry that have
sometimes been discussed (e.g [3, 19, 20, 21])
7example16
The operation of Section II’s robot is not time neutral in at
least two respects. First the robot receives information about
external events in its past (closer to the big bang) and not the
future17. Second, its processing of the received information
is not time neutral. The flow of information from recording
to erasure defines a direction in time. As mentioned in Sec-
tion II, that direction gives a concrete model for the subjective
feeling of inexorable forward progression in time commonly
called the ‘psychological arrow of time’. In natural IGUSes,
such as ourselves, information flows from past to future. More
specifically the records in registers P1, · · · ,Pn are of external
events to the past of those in P0 in decreasing order of time
from the big bang. This is the reason that Section II’s robot
could be said to experience the present, remember the past,
and predict the future18
Could a robot be constructed that receives information from
the future? Could one be constructed whose psychological ar-
row of time runs from future to past with the consequence that
it would remember the future? Both of these possibilities are
consistent with time neutral dynamical laws. But two familiar
time asymmetries of our universe prohibit such constructions
as a practical matter. These are the radiation arrow of time
and the arrow of time associated with the second law of ther-
modynamics.
Records of the future are possible as in a table of future
lunar eclipses19. Indeed, records of the future are the out-
come of any useful process of prediction. But, our robot’s
records of the future are obtained by computation, whereas its
records of the past are created by simple, automatic, sensory
mechanisms. These are very different processes both physi-
cally and from the point of view of information processing by
the robot.20 By a robot that remembers the future, we mean
one constructed21 as in Section II with the records in registers
P1, · · · ,Pn of events to the future of P0.
First consider the question of whether information from the
future could be recorded by the robot. In our universe, elec-
16 For reviews of the physics of time asymmetry from various perspectives,
see [3, 16, 17, 18, 19]. There is also some discussion in the Appendix.
These are only a few of the references where these issues are treated.
17 More precisely, registered signals originate from events within the past
light cone of their reception event. We use ‘future’ and ‘past’ in the present
discussion understanding that in each case these are defined by an appro-
priate light cone as described in Section III.A.
18 In Section II we defined the robot’s past to be the records in the registers
P1, · · · ,Pn . If information flows from past to future in the robot, that notion
coincides with the physical past defined as the direction in time towards
the big bang. From now on we assume this congruence except where dis-
cussing its possible violation, as in this section.
19 We use the term ‘record’ in a time-neutral sense of an alternative at one
time correlated with high probability with an alternative at another time —
future or past. Thus, there can be records of the future.
20 Realistic IGUSes, such as human beings, also create records of the past by
computation as in differing interpretations of past experience, and as in the
collective construction of human history, and the history of the universe.
However, we did not explicitly endow our robot with these functions.
21 In Section IV we will describe a different construction of a robot which
could be said to remember the future.
tromagnetic radiation is retarded — propagating to the future
of its emission event. That time asymmetry is the radiation
arrow of time. The electromagnetic signals recorded by the
robot propagated to it along the past light cone of the recep-
tion event. The images received by the robot, whether of the
cosmic background radiation, distant stars and galaxies, or
the happenings in its immediate environment, are therefore
all from past events. As far as we know, all other carriers,
neutrinos for example [22], are similarly retarded. One rea-
son the robot doesn’t remember the future is that it receives
no information about it.
Irrespective of the time its input originates, could a robot
like that in Section II be constructed whose psychological ar-
row of time is reversed, so that internally information flows
from future to past? In such a robot the events recorded in
registers P1, · · · ,Pn would lie to the future of that in P0 — fur-
ther from the big bang. The robot would thus remember the
future. Such a construction would run counter to the arrow
of time specified by the second law of thermodynamics as we
now review22.
All isolated subsystems of the universe evolve toward equi-
librium. That is statistics. But the preponderance of isolated
systems in our universe are evolving toward equilibrium from
past to future, defining an arrow of time. That is the second
law of thermodynamics that is expressed quantitatively by the
inexorable increase of an appropriately defined total entropy.
If the robot processes information irreversibly then its psy-
chological arrow of time must generally be congruent with
the thermodynamic arrow of time. The formation of records
are crucial steps. An increase in total entropy accompanies
the formation of many realistic records. An impact crater in
the moon, an ancient fission track in mica, a darkened photo-
graphic grain, or the absorption of a photon by the retina are
all examples.
But an increase in total entropy is not a necessary conse-
quence of forming a record. Entropy increase is necessary
only on the erasure of a record [25]. For the model robot dis-
cussed in Section II, the only part of its operation in which
entropy must necessarily increase is in the erasure of the con-
tents of the register Pn at each step23. However, that is enough.
To see that, imagine the process of erasure run backwards
from future to past. It would be like bits of smashed shell
reassembling to form an egg.
To construct a robot with a reversed psychological arrow of
time it would be necessary to reverse the thermodynamic ar-
row, not only of the robot, but also of the local environment it
is observing. That is possible in principle. However, since we
have a system of matter coupled to electromagnetic radiation,
it would be necessary to deal with every molecule and photon
within a radius of 2×1010 km to reverse the system for a day.
22 Many authors have connected the ‘psychological’ arrow of time with that
of the second law. See, e.g. [17, 23, 24].
23 Possibly an isolated robot could be constructed on the principles of re-
versible computation [26] that would not have an erasure step. However,
it seems unlikely that the whole system of robot plus a realistic observed
environment could be reversible.
8More advanced civilizations may find this amusing. We can
have the same fun more cheaply by running the film through
the projector in reverse.
The origin of both the thermodynamic and radiation arrows
of time are the time-asymmetric boundary conditions that sin-
gle out our universe from the many allowed by time-reversible
dynamical laws. These boundary conditions connect the two
arrows. A brief sketch of the relevant physics is given in the
Appendix, although it is not necessary for understanding the
main argument of this paper. But it is interesting to think that
our subjective distinction between future and past can ulti-
mately be traced to the cosmological boundary conditions that
distinguish the future and past of the universe.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
The preceding discussion suggests that the laws of physics
do not define unambiguous notions of past, present, and fu-
ture by themselves. Rather these are features of how specific
IGUSes gather and utilize information. What then is the ori-
gin of the past, present, and future organization of information
in familiar, naturally-occurring IGUSes? Is it the only orga-
nization compatible with the laws of physics? If not, does it
arise uniquely from evolutionary imperatives, or is it a frozen
accident that took place in the course of three billion years of
biological evolution? This section discusses such questions.
Certainly some features of the laws of physics are essential
prerequisites to the functioning of Section II’s robot. There
would be no past, present, and future at all if spacetime did
not have timelike directions. The fact that IGUSes move on
timelike rather than spacelike world lines is the main part
of the reason they can have an approximate common ‘now’
rather than an approximate common ‘here’. An IGUS func-
tioning in a spacetime where it moved along a closed timelike
curve could not maintain a consistent notion of past and fu-
ture. Likewise, a local distinction between past and future
would be difficult to maintain in the absence of the arrows of
time discussed in Section II. But the features of the physical
laws of dynamics and the initial condition of the universe that
are necessary for a past, present, future organization of tempo-
ral information are consistent with other organizations of this
information as we now show.
A. Different Organizations of Temporal Information
Perhaps the easiest way of convincing oneself that the no-
tions of past, present, and future do not follow from the laws
of physics is to imagine constructing robots that process in-
formation differently from the one described in Section II. We
consider just three examples:
The Split Screen (SS) Robot. This robot has input to C com-
putation from both the most recently acquired data in P0
and from that in a different register PJ that was acquired
a proper time τs ≡ Jτ∗ earlier along its world line. There
is thus input to conscious computation from two times.
The Always Behind (AB) Robot. This robot has input to C
computation only from a particular register PK ,K > 0
and the schema. That input is thus always a proper time
τd ≡ Kτ∗ behind the most recently acquired data.
The No Schema (NS) Robot. This robot has input to C com-
putation from all the registers P0, · · · ,Pn equally. It em-
ploys no unconscious computation and constructs no
schema, but rather takes decisions by conscious com-
putation from all the data it has.
There seems to be no obstacle to constructing robots wired up
in these ways, and they process information differently from
the present, past, and future organization that we are familiar
with24.
An SS robot would have a tripartite division of recorded in-
formation. Its present experience — its ‘now’ — would con-
sist of two times (P0, PJ) — equally vivid and immediate. It
would ‘remember’ the intermediate times (P1, · · · ,PJ−1), and
the past (PJ+1, · · · ,Pn) through the U process of computation
and its influence on the schema.
The AB robot would also have a tripartite division of
recorded information. Its present experience would be the
contents of the the register PK. It would remember the past
stored in registers PK+1, · · · ,Pn. But also, it would remember
its future stored P0, · · · ,PK−1 a time τd ahead of its present
experience25. (Or perhaps we should say that it would have
premonitions of the future.)
What would discussions with an AB robot be like assum-
ing that our information processing is similar to the robot dis-
cussed in Section II? Assume for simplicity that we and the
AB robot are both nearly at rest in one inertial frame and that
contingencies 1) through 3) of Section III C are satisfied. The
AB robot would seem a little slow — responding in a time τd
or longer to questions. Its answers to queries about “What’s
happening now?” would seem out of date. It would be always
behind.
The NS robot would just have one category of recorded in-
formation. Conversations with an NS robot would be impres-
sive since it would recall every detail it has recorded about the
past as immediately and vividly as the present26.
The laws of physics supply no obstacle of principle to the
construction of robots with exotic organizations of informa-
tion processing such as the SS, AB, and NS robots. But are
such organizations a likely outcome of biological evolution?
Can we expect to find such IGUSes in nature in this or other
24 Some idea of what the notion of ‘present’ would be like for some of these
robots could be had by serving time in a virtual reality suit in which the
data displayed was delayed as in the AB case, or in which there was an
actual split screen as in the SS case. An alternative realization of the SS
robot’s experience might be produced by electrical stimulation of the cortex
that evokes memories of the past which are comparably immediate to the
present [27].
25 That is not in conflict with the discussion in Section IV because each record
is still of events in the past to the proper time it was recorded.
26 Perhaps not unlike conversations with Ireneo Funes in the Borges story
Funes the Memorious [28].
9planets? We speculate that we will not. It is adaptive for an
IGUS of everyday size to focus mainly on the most recently
acquired data as input to making decisions. The effective low-
energy laws of physics in our universe are local in spacetime
and the nearest data in space and time is usually the most rel-
evant for what happens next. A frog predicting the future po-
sition of a fly needs the present position and velocity of the
fly, not its location 10s ago. An AB frog would be at a great
competitive disadvantage in not focusing on the most current
information. An SS frog would be wasting precious conscious
focus on data from the past that is less relevant for immediate
prediction than current data.
An NS robot is making inefficient use of computing re-
sources in giving equal focus to present data and data from
the past whose details may not effect relevant future predic-
tion. Employing a schema to process the data is plausibly
adaptive because is a more efficient and faster way of pro-
cessing data with limited computing resources. The collec-
tive IGUS linked by human culture certainly evolved to make
use of schema rather than focus on the individual records that
went into them. For instance, prediction of the future of the
universe is much simpler from a Friedman-Robertson-Walker
model characterized by a few cosmological parameters than
directly from the records of the measurements that determined
them.
B. Different Laws, Different Scales
Something like the SS organization of temporal information
might be favored by evolution if the laws of physics were not
local in time. Suppose, for example, that the position of ob-
jects to the future of a time t depended27, not just on the force
acting and their position and velocity at that time, but rather
on their position at time t and on earlier times t−h and t−2h
for some fundamental fixed time interval h. Then an organi-
zation such as the SS robot with conscious focus on both the
most recently acquired data and that acquired at times h and
2h ago might be favored by evolution.
Similarly different organizations might evolve if the IGUS
is not smaller than the scale over which light travels on the
characteristic times of relevant change in its environment. The
present, past, future organization is unlikely to serve such an
IGUS well because these notions are not well defined in these
situations, as discussed in Section III.C. As mentioned there,
the galactic empires beloved of science fiction would be ex-
amples of such IGUSes. Faster-than-light travel inconsistent
27 It is not difficult to write down dynamical difference equations with this
property, for instance in a one dimensional model we could take
F(t) = m
[x(t)−2x(t −h)+ x(t −2h)]
2h2
.
where x(t) is the body’s position, m its mass, and F(t) the force. However,
such equations are not consistent with special relativity and the author is
not suggesting a serious investigation of alternatives to Newtonian mechan-
ics.
with special relativity is often posited by authors whose sto-
ries feature these empires to make their narratives accessible
to IGUSes like ourselves that do employ — however, approx-
imately — a present, past, and future organization of informa-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
A subjective past, present, and future are not the only con-
ceivable way an IGUS can organize temporal data in a four-
dimensional physical world consistently with the known laws
of physics. But it is a way that may be adaptive for localized
IGUSes governed by local physical laws. We can conjecture
that a subjective past, present, and future is a cognitive univer-
sal [5] of such localized IGUSes. That is a statement accessi-
ble to observational test, at least in principle.
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APPENDIX A: THE COSMOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF TIME’S
ARROWS
The origin of our universe’s time asymmetries is not to be
found in the fundamental dynamical laws which are essen-
tially time-reversible. Rather, both the radiation and the ther-
modynamic arrows of time arise from special properties of
the initial condition of our universe28. This appendix gives
a simplified discussion of these special features starting, not
at the very beginning, but at the time the hot initial plasma
had become cool enough to be transparent to electromagnetic
radiation. This is the time of “decoupling” in cosmological
parlance — about 400,000 years after the big bang or a little
over 13 billion years ago.
As Boltzmann put it over a century ago: “The second law
of thermodynamics can be proved from the [time-reversible]
mechanical theory if one assumes that the present state of the
28 e.g. Hawking’s ‘no boundary’ wave function of the universe [29].
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universe. . . started to evolve from an improbable [i.e. spe-
cial] state” [30]. The entropy of matter and radiation usu-
ally defined in physics and chemistry is about 1080 in the re-
gion visible from today at the time of decoupling (in units of
Boltzmann’s constant). This seems high, but it is in fact vastly
smaller than the maximal value of about 10120 if all that matter
was dumped into a black hole [17]. The entropy of the matter
early in the universe is high because most constituents are in
approximate thermal equilibrium. However, the gravitational
contribution of the smooth early universe to the entropy is near
minimal, and entropy can grow by the clumping of the matter
arising from gravitational attraction leading to the galaxies,
stars and other inhomogeneities in the universe we see today.
Amplifying on Boltzmann’s statement above, the explana-
tion of why the entropies of isolated subsystems are mostly in-
creasing in the same direction of time is this: The progenitors
of these isolated systems were all further out of equilibrium
at times closer to the big bang (the past) than they are today.
Earlier the total entropy was low compared to what it could
have been. It has therefore has tended to increase since.
The radiation arrow of time can also be understood as
arising from time-asymmetric cosmological boundary condi-
tions applied to time-reversible dynamical laws. These are
Maxwell’s equations for the electromagnetic field in the pres-
ence of charged sources. Their time-reversal invariance im-
plies that any solution for specified sources at a moment of
time can be written at in either of two ways: (R) a sum of
a free field (no sources) coming from the past plus retarded
fields whose sources are charges in the past, or (A) a sum
of a free field coming from the future plus advanced fields
whose sources are charges in the future. More quantitatively,
the four-vector potential Aµ(x) at a point x in spacetime can
be expressed in the presence of four-current sources jµ(x) in
Lorentz gauge as either
Aµ(x) = Ainµ (x)+
∫
d4x′Dret(x− x′) jµ(x′) (R)
or
Aµ(x) = Aoutµ (x)+
∫
d4x′Dadv(x− x′) jµ(x′) (A).
Here, Dret and Dadv are the retarded and advanced Green’s
functions for the wave equation and Ainµ (x) and Aoutµ (x) are
free fields defined by these decompositions.
Suppose there were no free electromagnetic fields in the
distant past so that Ainµ (x)≈ 0. Using the R description above,
this time asymmetric boundary condition would imply that
present fields can be entirely ascribed to sources in the past.
This is retardation and that is the electromagnetic arrow of
time.
This explanation needs to be refined for our universe be-
cause, at least if we start at decoupling, there is a significant
amount of free electromagnetic radiation in the early universe
constituting the cosmic background radiation (CMB). Indeed,
at the time of decoupling the energy density in this radiation
was approximately equal to that of matter. Even today, ap-
proximately 13 billion years later, after being cooled and di-
luted by the expansion of the universe, the CMB is still the
largest contributor to the electromagnetic energy density in
the universe by far.
The CMB’s spectrum is very well fit by a black body law
[31]. That strongly suggests that the radiation is disordered
with maximal entropy for its energy density. There is no evi-
dence for the kind of correlations (sometimes called ‘conspir-
acies’) that would tend to cancel Aoutµ (x) in the far future and
give rise to advanced rather than retarded effects29.
The expansion of the universe has red-shifted the peak lu-
minosity of the CMB at decoupling to microwave wavelengths
today. There is thus a negligible amount energy left over from
the big bang in the wavelengths we use for vision, for instance.
The radiation used by realistic IGUSes is therefore retarded.
A contemporary robot functioning at wavelengths where the
CMB is absent will therefore be receiving information about
charges in the past. This selection of wavelengths is plausibly
not accidental but adaptive. A contemporary robot seeking to
function with input from microwave wavelengths would find
little emission of interest, and what there was would be over-
whelmed by the all-pervasive CMB, nearly equally bright in
all directions, and carrying no information.
29 For an experiment that checked on advanced effects see [32].
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